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LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN THE DISTRICT COURT
The following parties appeared in the proceeding in the
District Court:
1.

The State of Utah, Plaintiff, represented by the Cache

County Attorney's Office, Gary McKean and by Assistant Attorney
General Joanne Slotnik.
2.

Defendant Jack D. Brocksmith.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff/Appellee,

]
Case No. 930146-CA

vs.

]

JACK D. BROCKSMITH,
Defendant/Appellant.

]>

First District Court
No. 921000051

])

Priority No. 2

APPELLANT JACK BROCKSMITH?S BRIEF

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to §§ 78-2(a)-l et seq. Utah Code Ann. (1953 as
amended), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3, and Article VIII
§ 1 et seq of the Utah Constitution.

Defendant/Appellant entered

a plea of guilty to six counts of communications fraud on January
14, 1993.

Defendant/Appellant filed

a Motion to Withdraw Plea

on or about February 8, 1993, which motion was denied by the
Court on or about March 9, 1993 and March 24, 1993.
Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 attached hereto.)

(See

Notice of appeal was

mailed pro se on or about March 4, 1993.

(See Exhibit 4 attached

hereto.)
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from the District Court's denial of
Appellant's Motion to Withdraw Plea in the First Judicial
District Court of Cache County, State of Utah, on March 9 and
March 24, 1993.
Brocksmith.

Defendant/Appellant is hereafter referred to as

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow Appellant
to withdraw his plea of guilty to charges entered just days
previously, after the State had violated § 77-29-5 et sea, Utah
Code Ann.. after the State had violated Defendant!s rights to a
speedy trial, after the State had denied access to the courts by
the Defendant, and after the State had violated numerous rules
and laws amounting to a denial of equal protection of the laws
and due process under both the Utah and United States
Constitutions•
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Background and Statement of Facts.

1.

On January 9, 1989, Detective Jim Williamson of the

Logan City Police Department appeared before the Honorable Clint
Judkins, Judge of the Circuit Court in the First Judicial
District for Cache County, Utah, and swore to an affidavit,
requesting a search warrant and a warrant of arrest for the
Defendant.

A search was conducted on January 9, 1989, and a

return made on January 12, 1989.
2.

(See Record, pp. 215 and 622.)

On June 28, 1989, an arrest warrant was issued by the

Fourteenth Circuit Court of Mercer County, Illinois, on felony
charges for the Defendant (Case No. 89-CF-54), charging theft.
(Referred on Record, p. 53.)
3.

Defendant Brocksmith was arrested in Utah on July 11,

1989, with a petition for the issuance of a warrant of arrest for
Defendant as a fugitive from justice pursuant to the Illinois
warrant of arrest being filed on July 13, 1989, together with an
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accompanying affidavit in the Cache County Circuit Court case
(No. 891000741) in the First Circuit Court in and for Cache
County, Utah.
4.

On July 13, 1989, a warrant of commitment pending the

issuance of a governor's warrant was issued in the First Judicial
Circuit Court and on July 17, 1989, a commitment was issued by
the First Circuit Court commanding any peace officer to take the
Defendant into custody and to hold him pending an order of
release or the posting of bail in the amount of $200,000.00.
5.

The Defendant was incarcerated in the Cache County Jail

pursuant to the Illinois warrant of arrest on July 11, 1989, and
was held thereafter until October 5, 1989, pursuant to the
warrant of commitment pending governor's warrant and the
commitment issued by the First Circuit Court.

On October 5,

1989, the State of Utah filed an information and an affidavit of
probable cause against the Defendant in Circuit Court Case No.
892001140 in the First Circuit Court for Cache County, charging
eight counts of communications fraud as second degree felonies,
ten counts of theft by deception as second degree felonies, and
one count of theft by deception as a third degree felony.

(See

Record, p. 216 and referenced p. 165.)
6.

On October 10, 1989, the Defendant appeared in the

Circuit Court with his attorney, Donald C. Hughes, Jr., and
waived preliminary hearing.

(See Record, p. 216.)

On October

11, 1989, the Defendant was bound over for trial in the District
Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Utah in and
for the County of Cache.

(See Record, referenced pp. 165 and 216.)
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7.

On October 19, 1989, Mr. Brocksmith appeared in District

Court with his attorney and entered a plea of not guilty and
demanded a jury trial.

The Defendant did not waive his right to

a speedy trial nor his right to have a trial within 30 days as
provided by § 77-1-6(1)(h) Utah Code Ann. (1953), with Defendant
remaining incarcerated because of inability of post bail.

(See

Record, p. 216 and referenced p. 165.)
8.

The State of Utah claims that on October 25, 1989, a

motion to dismiss the information was mailed to the Defendant's
attorney, Donald C. Hughes, Jr., although Mr. Hughes by affidavit
denies receiving a copy of the motion to dismiss.

(See Record,

p. 512.)
9.

The District Court file contains a letter from

Brocksmith to the Honorable Gordon Low, Judge of the District
Court, dated October 31, 1989, in the form of a mailgram.

In the

mailgram Defendant stated that he was unable to reach his
attorney, did not know the status of his case, and asked:
is my right to a speedy trial?"
copy of the mailgram.
10.

"Where

The prosecutor did not receive a

(See Record, p. 305.)

For reasons that do not appear in the record, and in

the absence of the Defendant and his attorney, the District Court
signed an order dismissing the information without prejudice, but
did not give any reason for the dismissal in its order contrary
to the provisions of § 77-2-4 Utah Code Ann. (1953), and Rule
25(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
306.)

(See Record, p.

The ex parte order dismissed Case No. 891000111 and on the

same date the Defendant was transferred to the State of Illinois
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Illinois for prosecution on state and federal charges.

Defendant

has testified (see Record, p. 513) that he was not informed of
the State's motion to dismiss by his attorney or directly by the
State of Utah.
11.

Defendant Brocksmith's mailgram requesting a speedy

trial was not filed until November 8, 1989, and the Court took no
action on his request for reconsideration of the Court's order.
12.

On December 21, 1989, the State of Utah filed virtually

identical charges which it had moved to dismiss just six weeks
earlier, based upon an affidavit of probable cause for
information.

(See Record, p. 187-208.)

The State did not send a

copy of the newly filed information to the Defendant, although it
did send a copy to Attorney Donald C. Hughes, Jr. and Attorney
Robert Gutke.

At no time did the State of Utah notify the

District Court that it was refiling the charges in the Logan
Circuit Court (No. 891001462).

That new information charged four

counts of communications fraud as first degree felonies, ten
counts of theft by deception as second degree felonies, and one
count of theft by deception, a third degree felony.
13.

On February 7, 1990, the Defendant requested

disposition of the charges against him in Utah pursuant to the
Interstate Detainer Act to which Utah is a party under the
provisions of § 77-29-5 Utah Code Ann. (1953).
396.)

(See Record, p.

The application for disposition was filed in the District

Court of Cache County on March 1, 1990, and a copy of which was
received by the Cache County Attorney.
and 397.)

(See Record, pp. 181, 182

The application was prompted by notice from the chief
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jailer in Mercer County, Illinois, that new charges had been
filed against him by the State of Utah.

The Cache County

Attorney's Office acknowledges receipt of the application for
disposition on March 12, 1990.
14.

Without notice to the Defendant, the Cache County

Attorney appeared before the District Court of the First Judicial
District on March 26, 1990, but did not inform the District Court
that virtually identical charges which had been previously
dismissed by the District Court had been refiled in the Circuit
Court.

Failure by the County Attorney to notify the District

Court of the true nature of pending charges precluded the
District Court from filing Brocksmith's application for
disposition under IAD with the Circuit Court.

Instead, the

County Attorney asked the District Court to not modify its order
of dismissal of November 6, 1989, which had dismissed the
previous charges.

The minute entry in the District Court

originally stated that the cases are to remain the s a m e —
"dismissed ... until charges in Illinois are determined."

No

formal order was prepared and no notice was given to the
Defendant.

On April 2, 1990, Assistant Utah Attorney General

C.C. Horton II wrote a letter to the Mercer County Sheriff and
stated that:
point."
15.

"... Mr. Brocksmith's request is premature at this

(See Record, pp. 179 and 394-95.)
On April 3, 1990, Ron E. Miller, Special Agent for the

Utah Attorney General's Office, sent a certified felony warrant
of arrest and a letter to the Mercer County Sheriff which
requested that Mercer County "... hold Brocksmith for Utah

-6-

authorities when Illinois state and federal criminal proceedings
are finished."
16.

(See Record, p. 519.)

On June 5, 1990, the Defendant sent his first of three

requests for a public defender to the First Judicial Circuit
Court in Case No. 891001462.

This request was filed in the

Circuit Court where charges were then pending.
taken on the request.
17.

No action was

(See Record, p. 183.)

On July 25, 1990, the charges in Illinois were

determined and the Defendant was sentenced and given credit for
the time previously served.

Even though the 180-day period

mandated by § 77-29 et seq. Utah Code Ann. would expire on
September 1, 1990, the State of Utah took no action to have the
Defendant brought to Utah for trial. Defendant was released from
the Mercer County Jail on July 31, 1990, into the custody of
federal authorities.
18.

On August 2, 1990, the Utah Attorney General's Office

sent a certified copy of a felony warrant of arrest and a letter
to James Fyke, United States Marshal in Springfield, Illinois,
which requested that "... you hold Brocksmith for Utah
authorities when Illinois federal criminal proceedings are
finished."

(See Record, pp. 166 and 399.)

This letter was

received by the federal marshal on August 10, 1990.
19.

On August 9, 1990, Defendant was released from federal

custody on an appearance bond and was free on bond until January
31, 1991, the date Defendant was convicted of federal mail fraud
charges.
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20.

On March 16, 1991, the Defendant, acting pro se, filed

a motion to dismiss all charges in the District Court of the
First Judicial District.

(See Record, referenced p. 165.)

The

District Court took no action on the Defendant's motion, nor did
the District Court inform the Defendant that charges were pending
in the Circuit Court and that his motion should be filed with
that Court.

On that same date, the Defendant made his second

written request for the assistance of counsel.
referenced p. 165.)

(See Record,

Defendant requested counsel to assist him

with his motion to dismiss.

Defendant's motion was never

entertained by the Court as the Court was under the erroneous
impression that no charges were then pending against the
Defendant because the County Attorney had failed to notify the
District Court of the pending charges in Circuit Court.
21.

On April 23, 1991, the Defendant requested a decision

on his motion and on April 30, 1991, Defendant again requested
that counsel be appointed because of his indigent status.
action was taken on the Defendant's requests.

No

The letter sent by

Mr. Brocksmith also represents three phone calls to the District
Court inquiring as to the disposition of his motion to dismiss.
Even though the Cache County Attorney received a copy of the
motion to dismiss, no response was forthcoming from either the
Court or the County Attorney.

Having been unable to obtain

counsel or a hearing on his request for speedy trial in the State
Courts, Defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court, District of Utah, Central Division.
request was denied because the Federal Court, relying on the
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That

March 26, 1990 minute entry filed in the Cache County District
Court, found that no charges were pending against the Defendant
in the State of Utah.

(See Record, referenced p. 165.)

Because

the County Attorney failed to notify the Federal District Court
of the pending Circuit Court charges, the Federal Court found
that Defendant had not exhausted his state remedies.
22.

The Defendant appealed the denial of the habeas action

but later withdrew the appeal as he was under the impression that
charges against him had, in fact, been dismissed.
23.

On May 13, 1991, Defendant was sentenced on federal

charges and incarcerated temporarily in the Chicago Metro
Correction Center.

On June 4, 1991, Defendant was permanently

incarcerated at the Sandstone Federal Correctional Institution in
Sandstone, Minnesota.
24.

On June 26, 1991, the Cache County Attorney lodged a

third detainer against the Defendant, under the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers Act, with the Sandstone Federal
Correctional Institution, Sandstone, Minnesota.
25.

On June 27, 1991, the State of Utah filed a request for

temporary custody of the Defendant.

The request for temporary

custody was not approved, recorded and transmitted by the Circuit
Court Judge having jurisdiction over the information which formed
the basis for the detainer lodged against the Defendant, as
required by Article IV, subsection (a) of the Interstate
Agreement.
26.

(See Record, p. 330.)
Defendant requested and was given 30 days in which to

challenge his transfer to Utah based upon violation of his rights
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under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.
period expired on August 24, 1991.

That 30-day waiting

On July 3, 1991, Defendant

sent a third written request for counsel to the First Judicial
District Court.

(See Record, referenced p. 165.)

The request

was mailed to the Utah Attorney General's Office and the Cache
County Attorney.

Defendant received no response from this

request.
27.

On July 7, 1991, Defendant wrote to the Cache County

Attorney and indicated that he was contesting his transfer to
Utah as being a violation of his rights under the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers.

(See Record, p. 332.)

Defendant did not

renew his request for final disposition of the Utah charges after
he was incarcerated at the Sandstone Federal Correctional
Institute, under the belief that his previous request, even if it
had been premature, was triggered upon his permanent placement.
28.

On August 26, 1991, federal authorities at Sandstone

offered to deliver temporary custody of the Defendant to Utah
authorities (see Record, p. 173) and on February 20, 1992, the
Defendant was brought before the Logan Circuit Court.

For the

first time since he had initially requested counsel on April 30,
1991, he was appointed counsel to defend him.

This was

approximately 176 days following the federal authorities1 offer
of temporary custody.
29.

On February 24, 1992, the Defendant, through his court-

appointed counsel, filed a motion to dismiss based upon violation
of Defendant's constitutional right to speedy trial, as well as
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violation of the terms and provisions of the Interstate Agreement
on Detainers.
30.

(See Record, p. 105.)

On March 17, 1992, the State filed a motion to quash

the Defendant's motion to dismiss, alleging that magistrates in a
felony case do not have jurisdiction to entertain a motion to
dismiss for violation of speedy trial.

On April 2, 1992, the

Honorable Clint S. Judkins, acting as a magistrate, entered an
order granting the State's motion and quashing the Defendant's
motion to dismiss.
31.

(See Record, p. 31.)

On April 27, 1992, a preliminary hearing was conducted

before the Honorable Burton H. Harris, acting as magistrate, and
the Defendant was bound over to the District Court on one first
degree felony count of communications fraud, three second degree
felony counts of communications fraud, ten second degree felony
counts of theft by deception, and one third degree felony count
of theft by deception.
32.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss in District Court

on May 1, 1992.

Defendant was arraigned on May 11, 1992.

On

August 19, 1992, the Defendant filed a motion for declaration of
invalidity, based upon the State's failure to obtain court
approval prior to transferring the Defendant to the State of
Utah.

(See Record, p. 428.)

The Court consolidated the motions

and a hearing was held thereon on September 24, 1992.

On October

5, 1992, the Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss and his
motion for declaration of invalidity.
591. )
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(See Record, pp. 568 and

33.

Defendant pled guilty to six counts of communications

fraud on January 14, 1993, and thereafter filed a motion to
withdraw plea, which motion was denied, and this appeal followed.
ARGUMENT
I
THE COURT ERRED BY NOT ALLOWING APPELLANT
BROCKSMITH TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY INASMUCH
AS THE STATE HAD VIOLATED THE INTERSTATE AGREEMENT
ON DETAINERS.
A.

The State Violated the 180-Day Trial Limit.

Utah is a party to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
(IAD) as adopted by U.C.A. § 77-29-1 et. seq. (1953).

Article

III of the (IAD) allows an imprisoned individual, against whom a
detainer has been lodged, to make a request for final disposition
of all charges pending in another state by placing a written
demand with the official having custody of him or her:
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a
term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional
institution of a party state, and whenever during
the continuation of the term of the imprisonment
there is pending in any other party state any
untried indictment, information or complaint on
the basis of which a detainer has been lodged
against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial
within 180 days after he shall have caused to be
delivered to the prosecuting officer and the
appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's
jurisdiction written notice of the place of his
imprisonment and his request for final disposition
to be made of the indictment, information or
complaint; (See U.C.A. § 77-29-5.)
Article III specifies that the demand for final notice be
given to the official having custody of the prisoner:
(b) Written notice and request for final
disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof
shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the
warden, commissioner or corrections or other
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official having custody of him, who shall promptly
forward it together with the certificate of the
appropriate prosecuting official and court by
registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested.
Significantly, the statue further requires that:
(d) Any request for final disposition made
by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof
shall operate as a request for final disposition
of all untried indictments, informations or
complaints on the basis of which detainers have
been lodged against the prisoner from the state to
whose prosecuting official the request for
disposition is specifically directed.
Id. (emphasis added).
Accordingly, "any request for final disposition" that a
prisoner makes should be treated as a demand on the receiving
state to comply with the terms of IAD.

Indeed, the legislature

has placed only this IAD burden on the prisoner, that is, to send
a request for disposition.

His sending of that request shifts

the burden to the prison officials who have custody over him to
prepare and send the forms to the receiving state.

See Henaqer

vs. State, 716 P.2d 669, 673 (Okla. Cr. 1986).
Defendant filed his original request for final disposition
on February 7, 1990 with the Mercer County Sheriff who had
custody over him.

His request waived extradition and indicated

his understanding that the sheriff was to send his request with
the terms of his incarceration to prosecuting officials in Utah.
Thus, Defendant's request itself complied with the notice
requirements of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.

As noted

by the court in Gibson v. Klevenhaqen, 777 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir.
1985), the Court may be hard-pressed to conceive of a way in
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which Defendant Brocksmith, acting as his own counsel, could have
effected any better compliance with IAD.

Id. at 1058.

Defendant

Brocksmith had no duty following his sending of his February 7,
1990 request for final disposition.
disposition.

His letter was a request for

See Nash v. Jeffes, 739 F.2d 878 (3rd Cir. 1984),

affirmed, in part, Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 105 S.Ct.
3401, 87 L.#d.2d 516 (1985).
But Defendant did more than file his original request for
disposition.

He also filed, on March 15, 1991, a motion to

dismiss the charges pending against him in Utah.

This motion was

filed in the First District Court in Cache County, Utah, and
operated as his second request for final disposition of the Utah
charges.

in United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 98 S.C. 1834,

56 L.Ed. 2ci 329 (1978), the United States Supreme Court found that
a defendant's Motion to Dismiss, which did not even mention the

Interstate

Agreement on Detainers,

was sufficient

to put

the

state on notice of defendant's claim under IAD:
The record shows that from the time he was
arrested [the defendant] persistently requested
that he be given a speedy trial. After his trial
date had been continued for the third time, he
sought the dismissal of his indictment on the
ground that the delay in bringing him to trial
while the detainer remained lodged against him was
causing him to be denied certain privileges at the
state prison. We deem these activities on [the
defendant's] part sufficient to put the Government
and the District Court on notice of the substance
of his claim.
Id. at 349-50.
Similarly, in Henager v. State, 716 P.2d 669 (Okla. Cr.
1986), th§ defendant filed a request for final disposition and
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subsequently a Motion to Dismiss for violation of his speedy
trial rights.

The court found that the original request was

ineffective, but with respect to the Motion to Dismiss, ruled
that it served as adequate statutory notice to the state, thus
triggering its IAD responsibilities.

Id. at 673.

Defendant's motion was filed with the District Court and was
received by the Cache County Attorney.

Defendant's follow-up

correspondence regarding his motion to dismiss was also received
by the Court and the County Attorney.

Accordingly, the Court and

the State were on notice that the Defendant was requesting speedy
disposition of all Utah charges.

Simply put, Defendant had

discharged his obligation to file his request for final
disposition, the only request required of him under the IAD.
Defendant Brocksmith had, in fact, made repeated speedy trial
demands for trial to the District Court and to the County
Attorney that indicted him.

He had, therefore, exhausted all

available State Court remedies for consideration of his speedy
trial claims.

See Gibson at 1058.

It should be noted that there is no requirement in the
statute that the elements required under IAD be met in any
particular order.

Thus, even though Defendant filed his request

for final disposition before a formal detainer was lodged against
him, once the detainers were lodged and once Brocksmith began
serving a "term of imprisonment," the State's responsibilities
under the IAD ripened.
The sequencing for a prisoner's compliance with Article III
seems to be as follows:
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1.

The person must have entered "upon a term of

imprisonment."
2.

There must be pending in the sister state an untried

indictment, information or complaint.
3.

There must be a detainer lodged by the State against the

prisoner.
4.

The prisoner must cause a written notice be given to

both the prosecutor and the court of the jurisdiction which would
prosecute him.
5.

That request for disposition must notify the prosecutor

and the Court of his place of imprisonment and accompanied by a
certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the
prisoner.
There is nothing in the Act which requires that the abovecited sequence must be in the order recited.
In the case before this Court, the sequence appears as
follows:
1.

In February or March of 1990, the Cache County Attorney

received notice of the Defendant's request for disposition dated
February 7, 1990.

Said notice is on file in the District Court

of Cache County, Utah (File No. 891000111), showing a filing date
of March 1, 1990.

The Cache County Attorney's Office

acknowledges receipt of the application for disposition on March
12, 1990, and appeared in District Court on March 26, 1990, but
failed to disclose to the District Court that it had refiled
charges against the Defendant in the Circuit Court the previous
December 21st.
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2.

The County Attorney apparently felt obligated to appear

in District Court based on the notice received from the chief
jailer in Mercer County, Illinois, that recognized new charges
had been filed against Brocksmith by the State of Utah.

The

Cache County Attorney's Office acknowledges receipt of the
application for disposition on March 12, 1990.
3.

Detainers were filed by the State of Utah in the form of

a certified felony warrant mailed by Special Agent for the Utah
Attorney General's Office, Ron E. Miller, on or about April 3,
1990.

That felony warrant was mailed to the Mercer County

Sheriff in Illinois.

A second detainer was filed by the Utah

Attorney General's Office on August 3, 1990, wherein a certified
copy of a felony warrant of arrest and a letter to James Fike,
U.S. Marshal in Springfield, Illinois, was issued.

The federal

marshal received the detainer on August 10, 1990.
4.

The term of imprisonment began on May 13, 1991, when

Defendant was sentenced on federal charges and incarcerated at
the Chicago Metro Corrections Center, and was thereafter
permanently incarcerated at the Sandstone Federal Correctional
Institution in Sandstone, Minnesota, on June 4, 1991.
There should be no dispute that the final piece of the
puzzle to trigger IAD protections began on June 4, 1991. At that
point, the State had 180 days to bring Mr. Brocksmith to trial.
Inasmuch as Mr. Brocksmith did not enter his plea of guilty
until January 14, 1993, the State clearly violated its
obligations under IAD.
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On April 3, 1990, the Utah Attorney General's Office lodged
a detainer with the Mercer County Sheriff's Office in Aledo,
Illinois.

By it's own admission, the Mercer County Sheriff's

Office and the State of Illinois accepted this correspondence
from the Utah Attorney General as a formal detainer lodged
against Defendant Brocksmith.

(See Record, p. 586. )

On August

2, 1990, the Utah Attorney General's Office lodged a second
detainer with the Federal Marshal in Springfield, Illinois.

This

detainer was received by the federal authorities on August 10,
1990.

On June 26, 1991, the Cache County Attorney lodged a third

detainer with the federal authorities at the Sandstone Federal
Correctional Institution.

Thus, at various times--before, after

and during times when Mr. Brocksmith was incarcerated--the State
was filing detainers for him to be held.
The United States Supreme Court in Carchman v. Nash, 473
U.S. 716, 105 S.C. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985), has defined a
detainer as follows:
A detainer is a request filed by a criminal
justice agency with the institution in which the
prisoner is incarcerated, asking the institution
either to hold the prisoner or the agency or to
notify the agency when release of the prisoner is
imminent.
Id. at 526.

The multiple detainers filed against Brocksmith fit

squarely within this definition.
Significantly, in the present case charges were filed on
December 21, 1989, and an immediate arrest warrant was issued for
Defendant Brocksmith.

Because detainers are based on arrest

warrants, see Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 221-222 (5th

-18-

Cir. 1987), and because the charges against Mr. Brocksmith were
relayed by correctional authorities in Utah to the authorities in
Illinois, presumably through NCIC, Defendant Brocksmith was
notified sometime in December 1989 of the charges pending in
Utah.

Because he had been advised of the charges pending in

Utah, he filed his request for final disposition in February of
1990.

An arrest warrant issued and Utah was on notice that

Brocksmith had become aware of the Utah charges pending against
him, and that he wanted them resolved.

The State of Utah

formalized their intent to have a detainer placed on Mr.
Brocksmith on April 3, 1990. On that day the State sent formal
notice to the State of Illinois that they wanted Defendant
Brocksmith held pending the resolution of Illinois charges
against him.

The State cannot now argue that such a request does

not constitute a detainer.

As noted by the Court in U.S. v.

Schrum, 504 F.Supp. 23 (affirmed, 638 F.2d 215 (10th Cir. 1981),
prosecutors in receiving jurisdictions should think long and hard
before filing the detaining requests such as Utah did in April
1990, in August 1990, and in June 1991.

"If a [receiving

jurisdiction] wishes to avoid raising questions under the act and
is certain of the prisoner's continued incarceration ... it need
only refrain from filing a detainer, relying instead upon [a writ
of habeas corpus]."

Id. at 26.

In other words, the State of

Utah should have avoided filing their various detaining requests
with the State of Illinois if they did not intend to abide by the
IAD.
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To be sure, neither the State nor Defendant Brocksmith
filed, respectively, their detainers or disposition requests in
the order seemingly contemplated by the act.

Interpreting these

kinds of aberrant factual situations, the courts have generally
sided with defendants against the state.

Citing United States v.

Hutchins, 489 F.Supp. 710, 714-15 (N.D. Ind. 1980), the Court in
United States v. Reed, 910 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1990), ruled that
the IAD would be triggered immediately upon the prisoner becoming
incarcerated, even though the detainer and the request for
disposition occurred before the term of imprisonment began.
at 714-15.

As astutely noted by the court in Hutchins:

Id.

"The

agreement contemplated that ideally the prisoner involved will be
serving a sentence when his custodian notifies him of a detainer
and his rights under the agreement.

The timing thus

contemplated, however, is not essential and should not be
strictly required in a technical fashion when to do so would
undercut the purposes of the agreement."
The court then observed:

See Hutchins at 714.

"Although Article 111(a) mentions the

above four factors in the order listed [in the statute], there is
no explicit requirement that they accrue in any special
sequence."

Id. at 714.

In sum, when Defendant Brocksmith began serving his sentence
at the Sandstone Correctional Facility on June 4, 1991, all
requirements of the IAD were met and the State's responsibilities
thereunder were triggered.

The State had 180 days from June 4,

1991, to bring Defendant Brocksmith to trial.

By failing to do

so, the State violated the clear intent and specific requirement
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of Article 111(a) of the Act.

Defendant Brocksmith has

previously argued that the Act required the State to perform much
sooner than June 1991.

Indeed, when he made his request for

final disposition in February 1990, he was already incarcerated,
albeit as a pretrial detainee.

Moreover, when Defendant

Brocksmith was sentenced in Illinois in July 1990, he was given
credit for the prior 379 days he had served in the Mercer County
Jail.

An argument could be made that Defendant was serving a

"term of imprisonment" when both his request for final
disposition and the State's initial attempt at a detainer were
filed.

But even putting those arguments aside, the very latest

that all of the IAD requirements converge and trigger the 180-day
trial clock is June 4, 1991.

Accordingly, the State had until

December 3, 1991 to bring Defendant to trial or suffer the
consequences spelled out in the Act:

"If trial is not had on any

indictment, information or complaint contemplated [by the act]
prior to the return of the prisoner to the original place of
imprisonment, such indictment, information or complaint shall not
be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an
order dismissing the same with prejudice."

(See Article 111(d)

Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5.)
When did the State actually bring Brocksmith to trial?

On

January 14, 1993, 583 days after the indisputable entry upon a
term of imprisonment, June 4, 1991.

Utah missed the mark by 403

days, minus time which could be attributable to Mr. Brocksmith.
Fundamental fairness in this case requires that the 180-day time
limit commence running on June 4, 1991, the date on which
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Brocksmith began serving his sentence in Minnesota.

On that

date, all provisions of the IAD had been complied with:
Brocksmith was serving a term of imprisonment, a detainer had
been lodged, Defendant had made requests for final disposition of
his Utah charges, and the State had received the terms and
conditions of Defendant's incarceration.

As stated in United

States v. Reed, supra, at page 25, the statute is to be
"liberally construed to effect rapid disposal of outstanding
detainers."

The Court ruled that "when the government has failed

to fulfill its obligations under the act, yet the prisoner has
clearly attempted to get a speedy trial, courts have dismissed
indictments not prosecuted within 180 days."

Simply put, the

State waited too long to bring Defendant to trial.

They cannot

now be heard to complain that all of the statute's requirements
were not met or that they did not have sufficient time to bring
Defendant to trial.

Indeed, from February 1990—when Defendant

made his first request for final disposition—until January 1993-when Defendant finally entered his guilty plea in the State of
Utah--the State of Utah knew of Defendant Brocksmithfs intent to
have the State abide by the IAD and bring him to trial within 180
days.

Even so, almost three years went by before Defendant was

brought "to trial."

Unquestionably, Defendant's rights under the

IAD were violated and the State has no standing to bring or
continue the charges against him.
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B.

The State Violated Article V(e) of the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers.

Article V (e) of IAD requires:

"At the earliest practicable

time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner
shall be returned to the sending state."
The State circumvented the purpose and spirit of Article V
(e) of IAD by failing to transport the Defendant in a timely
manner after the offer of temporary custody had been provided by
federal authorities in Minnesota on August 26, 1991.
Notwithstanding the Defendant had repeatedly raised his request
for a speedy trial and defended extradition on the basis of
violation of his speedy trial rights, the State of Utah allowed
in excess of five months to go by before returning Defendant to
Utah for trial, violating the purpose and intent of Article IV of
the IAD.

In an analogous situation, the Supreme Court of

Washington in State v. Peterson, 585 P.2d 66 (Wash. 1978), found
that while speedy trial time limits do not begin to run until a
previously "unavailable" defendant is present within the
jurisdiction, the state must make a diligent effort to return a
defendant to the prosecuting state for trial:
Finally, under 3.3(f) the speedy trial time limits
applicable to a defendant who is absent and
thereby unavailable for trial do not run until the
defendant is actually present. However,
unavailability as established under this rule can
be shown only if the prosecution demonstrates good
faith and diligent efforts to obtain the
availability of the defendant. ... We agree with
that portion of State v. Hattori, 573 P.2d 829
(Wash. 1978), wherein the Court of Appeals states:
A defendant cannot be considered 'unavailable' for
purposes of Section 3.3(f), if his whereabouts are
known and reasonable efforts are not taken to
obtain his presence in the county wherein the
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charges are pending. If the state fails to
exercise reasonable efforts in obtaining the
defendant's presence, the time periods shall not
accrue anew within the meaning of TSection]
3.3(f). In determining whether the state has
acted reasonably, the time necessary for
transporting the defendant back to this state and
administrative delays caused by the foreign
jurisdiction as well as whether the defendant
waives extradition, are important factors to be
considered.
Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
In the present case, Utah authorities were well aware of
Brocksmith's location and had been aware during the entire
pendency of the Illinois charges.

Further, there were no

administrative delays in the sending jurisdiction which would
have prevented Defendant's return.

The State of Illinois offered

temporary custody of the Defendant on August 26, 1991.
Thereafter, the State allowed 176 days to expire before even
bringing the Defendant to Utah.

On this basis alone, as

expressed in Peterson, the delay in bringing Defendant Brocksmith
to Utah itself should be sufficient to require dismissal of the
charges against him.
C.

The State Violated the 120-Day Speedy Trial Provision
of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.

Article IV (a) of the IAD provides:
The appropriate officer ... shall be entitled to
have a prisoner ... made available ... upon
presentation of a written request for temporary
custody ..•;
In respect to any proceedings made possible by
this article, trial shall be commenced within one
hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner
in the receiving state ... . (c)
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Not only did the State wait 176 days before even bringing
Defendant Brocksmith to Utah, once they got him here on February
19, 1992, the State then waited almost an entire year before
bringing Defendant Brocksmith to trial.

Under the IAD, the State

has 120 days from the time a defendant arrives in the receiving
jurisdiction to bring that defendant to trial.
Ann. § 77-29-5 (IV)(c).

See Utah Code

As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in

State v. Viles, 702 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1985), this 120-day time
limitation is the legislatively expressed time limit for a
constitutionally speedy trial in cases involving the IAD:
[Under Article VI(a) of the Act] the running of
[these] time periods shall be tolled whenever and
for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand
trial, as determined by the court.
Id. at 1176.

The determinative phrase in this section is "unable

to stand trial."

As noted by the Sixth Circuit in U.S. v.

Birdwell, 983 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1993), "we decline to expand
[this] phrase to encompass legal inability due to the filing of
motions or requests."

Id. at 1340-41.

Thus, the Birdwell court

ruled that where a continuance was not granted or moved for by
either party, and neither could say a postponement was necessary,
the charges should have been dismissed.

And, while the Birdwell

court noted that if a state objected to or was unprepared to
respond to a defense motion, the trial court, sua sponte, or on
the motion of the prosecution could grant a reasonable
continuance, that such a continuance must be granted in open
court with the defendant or his counsel present.
then, will the 120-day period be tolled.

-25-

Then, and only

See also U.S. v. Roy.

830 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1987) (good cause must be shown in open
court in order to insure that the delay does not work to the
detriment of the substantial rights of the prisoner).

Id. at

634.
There was no "open court" good cause for a delay shown here,
other than Defendant Brocksmith?s own demand for an immediate
arraignment and trial setting on May 2, 1992. On that same day,
the State made its own demand for trial within the 120-day time
limit, acknowledging that the 120 days were about to run.

The

State further admitted that despite some pretrial motions by Mr.
Brocksmith, it was ready to proceed to trial.

Mr. Brocksmith did

file a motion to dismiss the charges against him after he was
finally brought back to Utah in the spring of 1992. But this did
not delay the State nor cause them to be unable to proceed to
trial.

Thus, without requesting a continuance, or being granted

one, the State's 120-day time limit to bring Defendant Brocksmith
to trial began running no later than February 19, 1992 (the day
he arrived in Utah), and ended on June 21, 1992. As
authoritatively stated by the Utah Supreme Court in an analogous
situation in State v. Shaw, 651 P.2d 115 (Utah 1982):
When the trial court has not been asked to
exercise the authority granted to it by the
agreement for extending the time to bring the
matter to trial, we find nothing in the agreement
or in logic which would give us the authority to
do so.
The district attorney may not have willfully
caused any delay in trying defendant, but as the
Klimec court noted, at 206 A.2d 382, that is not a
controlling issue nor is it a valid excuse for not
complying with the statute.
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We find no merit in any philosophy that pays lip
service to the principles of due process, speedy
trial, and binding interstate compacts ... and
then ignores those principles because their
benefits were called upon by the very person whose
interests were intended to be protected by them.
Id. at 120.
The State waited almost three years from the time of
Defendant's first request for final disposition of the charges
against him to bring him to trial, a period which included almost
a one year wait after Defendant Brocksmith was finally back
within the jurisdiction.

This unconscionable delay is the very

punishment that IAD was meant to prevent.

The Act gives very

little discretion to the trial court in this matter.

Indeed,

given the unquestioned delay of trial, the court had a duty to
dismiss the charges against Defendant Brocksmith with prejudice.
"If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint
contemplated [in the act] prior to the prisoner's being returned
to the original place of imprisonment ..., such indictment,
information or complaint shall not be of any further force or
effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same
with prejudice."

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5, Article IV(e)

(emphasis added).
II
THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
WITHDRAW PLEA BASED ON DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A
SPEEDY TRIAL UNDER SECTIONS 7 AND 24 OF ARTICLE I
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND AMENDMENT 4 OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
Section 77-1-6 of the Utah Code Annotated states that a
criminal defendant is entitled to be tried within 30 days of his
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arraignment if the business of the court permits.

Although this

section is directory in nature, the Utah Court of Appeals, in
State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204 (Utah App. 1991), has confirmed that
it provides guidelines for consideration of speedy trial issues:
However, Section 77-1-6 is directory in nature,
not mandatory ... . Nonetheless, a period of time
between arrest and trial in excess of the
statutory directive may well be a "triggering
mechanism" for heightened scrutiny of a claim that
the right to speedy trial was denied.
Id. at 207.
Heightened scrutiny requires that the Court consider factors
such as the length of the delay, the reason for the delay,
Defendant's assertions of his rights, and the prejudice to the
Defendant.

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182,

2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).

In this case, defendant was first

held to answer in October 1989.

Thereafter, the state obtained

an ex parte dismissal of the charges on November 6, 1989, and
then refiled those charges on December 21, 1989.

Excluding the

time between the latter two dates, over four years expired from
when Defendant was first held to answer for these charges and the
final disposition in January of 1993.

Although the State may

argue that this time period is not presumptively
unconstitutional, it certainly demands inquiry into the Barker
factors described above.
Under Barker, the Court must consider the reasons for the
delay.

In this case, there are several factors which contributed

to the delay.

Initially, the State refused to bring Defendant

Brocksmith to trial on the first set of charges, notwithstanding
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Defendant's desire to remain in Utah and face charges here.
Shortly after Defendant was transferred to Illinois to face
charges there, the State again filed charges against the
Defendant.

The State took no action to bring the Defendant to

trial while he was facing Illinois state and federal charges.
Nor did the State apply to the court for an extension of time in
which to prosecute based upon the fact that the Defendant was on
trial elsewhere.

However, even excluding the time Defendant was

facing state and federal charges in Illinois, the State failed to
transport the Defendant to Utah for more than nine months after
he was sentenced on federal charges in May 1991.

Only 30 days of

that time is attributable to Defendant and was based upon
Defendant's understanding that his right to speed trial had
already been violated.
Speedy trial time limits apply as much to prisoners
incarcerated elsewhere as to those who are not.
Peterson, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991).

See State v.

Clearly, after August 26,

1991, there were no obstacles created by the Defendant or
otherwise which would have prevented the State from bringing the
Defendant before the court in Utah.

Accordingly, the nearly 18

months that it took the State to bring Defendant to trial are
previously attributable to the State.
Under Barker, the Court must next consider whether the
Defendant asserted his right to speedy trial.

The Defendant

first requested a speedy disposition of the Utah charges against
him in his memorandum to the District Judge dated November 5,
1989.

That memorandum was received by the Court after the
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Defendant had been transported to Illinois.

However, it was

filed in the District Court file and indicated Defendant's desire
to obtain speedy disposition of Utah charges.

Defendant then

reiterated his request for speedy trial on February 7, 1990,
March 15, 1991, April 15, 1991, April 26, 1991, and in his
federal habeas corpus petition.

There can be no doubt that

Defendant made his request for speedy trial known.
It should also be noted that the State chose to request a
dismissal of charges against the Defendant in November 1989
rather than afford Defendant a speedy trial at that time.

This

was based upon the fact that Defendant had chosen to plead not
guilty to the charges.

However, the State refiled charges

against the Defendant only 45 days after obtaining a dismissal of
the first set of charges, indicating that the State was prepared
to go to trial at that time.

The only change in the second

information was to increase the degree of the communications
fraud charges to first degree felonies and reduce their number to
four.

Based on these facts, it is reasonable to assume that the

State could have proceeded to trial in December of 1989 and
afforded the Defendant a speedy trial at that time.
Contrary to the State's representations, the Defendant was
not informed of the State's decision to seek a dismissal of the
charges.

Had he been so informed, he would have objected.

He

had no opportunity to raise this issue as he was incarcerated and
not brought before the Court for this hearing.

A defendant is

entitled to be present at all stages of the proceedings against
him.

State v. Aikers, 51 P.2d 1052 (Utah 1935).
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Further, as

stated in People v. Lichtenstein, 630 P.2d 70, 72 (Colo. 1981),
the Court should consider the interests of the Defendant and
society when entertaining a motion to dismiss:
This provision parallels Federal Rule Crim. P. 48
(a) ... It is intended to give the court some
supervisory power over the prosecution of a case
so that the interests of justice, as well as the
interest of the defendant and society, can be
effected.
In addition, the reasons for a dismissal must be set forth
in the order so that "... all might know what invoked the court's
discretion and whether its action was justified."
v. Hanson, 425 P.2d 773 (Utah 1967).

Salt Lake City

In the instant case, the

order states that it is based on the State's motion, but does not
contain the specific basis for the dismissal.
Although the State represented that Defendant's attorney did
not object to dismissal of the charges, Brocksmith was not aware
of that fact and Brocksmith's attorney denies receiving a copy of
the Motion to Dismiss.

This factor should be carefully

considered in weighing whether Defendant's rights were violated.
Lastly, and contrary to cases under the Interstate Agreement
on Detainers, the Court must consider whether the Defendant was
prejudiced by the delay.

In Barker, prejudice included pretrial

incarceration, anxiety and concern of the accused, and impairment
of defense.

Certainly Defendant has experienced concern and

anxiety over the status of his case in Utah, as evidenced by his
continual requests for final disposition of his case, and his
federal habeas corpus action.

Brocksmith was unable to preserve

and prepare his defense on Utah charges as he had been
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and prepare his defense on Utah charges as he had been
transferred to Illinois and did not have local counsel appointed
who could have investigated factual issues surrounding his case
which were related to his defense and were of concern to the Mr.
Brocksmith.

Had he been brought to trial prior to being

transferred to Illinois, as was his desire, he would have had
access to fresh evidence and current recollections by defense
witnesses and his defense would not have been impaired.
Defendant became subject to the possibility of consecutive
sentencing, based upon his intervening conviction on federal
charges--certainly an issue of high anxiety.
The State delayed in prosecuting these charges, the
Defendant repeatedly requested speedy disposition of the charges,
Defendant was not brought into the jurisdiction of this Court
until over nine months after his sentencing on federal charges.
Only 30 days of that time was attributable to the Defendant and
Defendant was unable to obtain local counsel to assist him in
preparing and preserving his defense.

Accordingly, all the

factors in Barker weigh in favor of the Defendant and the charges
against him should be dismissed with prejudice.
Ill
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS BY THE FAILURE OF THE STATE
OF UTAH TO FOLLOW ITS OWN LAW AND PROCEDURES,
INCLUDING A DENIAL OF ACCESS TO THE COURT.
It is axiomatic that the State must treat all citizens alike
in its trial procedures.

The United States Supreme Court has

said:
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But no state is at liberty to impose upon one
charged with crime a discrimination in its trial
procedure which the constitution, and an act of
congress passed pursuant to the constitution,
alike forbid. Nor is this court to grant or
withhold the benefits of equal protection, which
the constitution commands for all, merely as we
may deem the defendant innocent or guilty.
Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 2 L.Ed.2d 991, 78 S.Ct. 970.
The State has committed multiple errors in not following its
own procedure.

Mr. Brocksmith was arrested on July 13, 1989.

Contrary to the mandate of the United State Supreme Court as
stated in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S.Ct. 1661, no
probable cause statement was filed.

Thereafter, Defendant

entered a plea of not guilty on October 19, 1989, and even though
he was in custody, no trial date was fixed within 30 days as
required by Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1)(h) (1953).

The Code

requires:
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant
is entitled: ... (h) to be admitted to bail in
accordance with provisions of law, or be entitled
to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if
unable to post bail and if the business of the
court permits.
While it is true that subsection (l)(h) is directory in
nature and not mandatory (State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991)), yet when the defendant remains in custody, the
obligation of the State increases proportionate to the length of
time that incarceration continues.
Subsection (l)(a) likewise entitles the Defendant "... to
appear in person and defend in person or by counsel."

This right

was also denied to Mr. Brocksmith when he was not permitted to be
present when the court dismissed the first information on
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November 6, 1989, nor when the court considered his claim for
immediate disposition of charges against him on March 26, 1990.
Arguably this constitutes a violation of Article I, Section 12 of
the Utah Constitution.
Rule 25(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
that the court must state the reasons for entering a dismissal of
charges and enter the same in the minutes.
November 6, 1989.

This was not done on

Defendant further is entitled to receive a

copy of the accusation filed against him, but when the
information was refiled on December 21, 1989, no copy of said
information was sent to Mr. Brocksmith nor had he been furnished
a copy of the information more than two years and two months
later.

This violates Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(1)(b).

One of the more critical violations by the State deals with
a defendantf s rights as an indigent person to be assigned
counsel:
Counsel shall be assigned to represent each
indigent person who is under arrest for or charged
with a crime in which there is a substantial
probability that the penalty to be imposed is
confinement in either jail or prison if:
(a)

The defendant requests it.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-2(1)(a) (1953).

The Court has previously

observed that this section is nothing more than a codification of
the constitutional rights to assistance of counsel and selfrepresentation as enunciated in State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239
(Utah 1988), affirmed 776 P.2d 631 (1989).
In this instance, Defendant requested counsel be appointed
for him on three separate occasions.
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These requests occurred on

June 5, 1990, March 16, 1991, and April 30, 1991, and can be
found or are referenced in the Court's own record on pages 183
and 165.
When the County Attorney moved ex parte to dismiss the first
information against Mr. Brocksmith on November 6, 1989, he waited
only 45 days to refile in the Circuit Court a new information
alleging virtually the same offenses but increasing the severity
of charges.

The District Court was unaware that new charges had

been filed in the Circuit Court and was therefore not disposed to
act upon the ongoing motions and requests by Mr. Brocksmith.

The

silence by the County Attorney's Office prevented the District
Court from fairly conveying the request for disposition made by
Mr. Brocksmith to the appropriate court or responding to his
request for counsel or to his request for a speedy trial.

Such

silence by the County Attorney's Office should not become a basis
for an inappropriate circumventing of Mr. Brocksmith's
constitutional rights.
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel have
variously been applied to criminal matters.
Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285.

State v. Irwin, 101

On March 26, 1990, the District Court

for the First Judicial District determined that the information
filed in this case was dismissed and shall remain dismissed.
September 24, 1991, the United States District Court for the
State of Utah found as a fact that:

"... there are no charges

pending against petitioner in the Utah courts at this time."
This finding was based on the Utah District Court's finding on
March 26, 1990, even though the District Court mistakenly
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On

referred to the date of March 15, 1990.

Mr. C. C. Horton, the

same Deputy Attorney General for Utah who had filed the
information in the Logan Circuit Court on December 21, 1989, was
a party defendant to the action in the United States District
Court.

The State of Utah was likewise a party to the proceeding

in the District Court in Cache County.

Despite the State

obviously being aware of the refiled charges, at no time did
either the County Attorney's Office or any Utah Assistant
Attorney disclose to either State or Federal District Court the
true state of affairs regarding the refiled charges.

Their

collective conspiracy of silence created confusion for the two
courts looking at the matter, and should not become a basis of
reward given for the State's conduct.

This information of the

refiled charges, which was withheld from the courts, was directly
contrary to the knowledge of the prosecutor who themselves had
refiled the charges.

Why no disclosure was made by the State's

officers has not yet been made known to either the courts or the
Defendant.
Inasmuch as the parties were identical in both instances,
the issues having been contested by the Defendant and the courts
in both cases having found that no information had in fact been
filed in either court, res judicata and collateral estoppel
arguably should have required dismissal of the charges with
prejudice.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The State of Utah breached its obligation to Mr. Brocksmith
under Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5, Articles 3, 4, and 5.
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Moreover,

United States Constitutions were violated by delays occasioned by
the State.

Multiple violations of equal protection and due

process, coupled with the previous problems described herein,
require the Court to remand the matter to the District Court for
withdrawal of the guilty plea previously entered with
instructions to thereafter dismiss the charges with prejudice.
Respectfully submitted this |S"~^ day of April, 1994.

v^ .a

y-<-

HERM OLSEN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing APPELLANT JACK BROCKSMITH'S BRIEF was deposited in the
United States mail to Joanne Slotnik, Assistant Attorney General,
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this ( S ^ ^
day of April, 1994.

Herm 01sen
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Exhibit 1

Motion to Withdraw Plea Under 77-13-6 and to
Demand Dismissal With Prejudice for Violation of
77-29-5

Exhibit 2

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
Denying Defendantf s Motion to Withdraw Plea

Exhibit 3

Memorandum Decision

Exhibit 4

Notice of Appeal
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JAN GRAHAM - 1231
Attorney General
C. C. HORTON II - 1542
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for the State of Utah
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1016
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GARY O. McKEAN - 2201
Cache County Attorney
Attorney for the State of Utah
110 North 100 West
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801) 752-8920

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JACK D. BROCKSMITH,

)
)
]I
;
I
]I

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA
District Court No: 921000051
(Circuit Court No: 891001462)

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court upon the Defendant's pro se
motion to withdraw plea. The matter was considered by the Court ex
parte, at the request of the State, and having reviewed both the
motion, the State's response to that motion, and the Court's file,
the Court enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law:

FEB

1 0 I99J
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FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court finds that:
1.

There was no condition of the plea negotiation nor any

provision of the Judgment, Sentence and Commitment entered in this
matter that imposed any specific deadline on the State for the
transfer of the Defendant from the custody of the Cache County Jail
to federal authorities, nor for the transportation of the Defendant
to the Sandstone Federal Correctional Institution.
2.

Defendant fails to show good cause for the withdrawal of

his plea as required by §77-13-6(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended•
3.

Defendant's motion improperly raises issues regarding

allegations of violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
and his right to a speedy trial. Those matters had previously been
appropriately and lawfully considered by this Court, and the
Defense motions with respect to those issues were lawfully denied.
4.

The Defendant, in fact, was transferred from the Cache

County Jail to federal authorities, and transported in the custody
of the Federal Authorities, on February 5, 1993, four (4) days
before the Defendant's Motion to Withdraw was actually filed,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea is inadequate and

fails to meet the criteria required by §77-13-6(2) (a), Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended.

M8/
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2.
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Because of the Defendant's transfer and transportation

from the Cache County Jail prior to the filing of his motion, the
motion is moot.
3.

The Defendant fails to state any basis upon which the

relief requested may be granted, and therefore the Motion to
Withdraw should be denied.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the Court has considered the matter ex parte, at the request
of the State, including a review of the Defendant's motion, the
State's response to that motion, and the Court's file.
Therefore, it is hereby ordered that the Defendant's Motion to
^ ^

Withdraw Plea is hereby denied.
DATED this

/ xfay of F^bfuary; 1993.
' W

BY THE COURT:

GORDON J. LOV^
District Judge

3

a
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the proposed
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw was delivered this date to Arden
Lauritzen, Co-Counsel for Defendant, Barbara King Lachmar, CoCounsel for Defendant, at their respective mailboxes at the
District Court.
DATED this //^ day of February,

1993.

Legal Assistant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea to Jack Brocksmith, Defendant,
at Sandstone Federal Correctional Institution, Sandstone, MN
55072.
DATED this //* day of February, 1993.
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
MEMORANDUM DECISION
vs.
CASE NO. 921000051
JACK D. BROCKSMITH,
Defendant

THIS MATTER IS BEFORE the Court upon the Defendant's Motion
for Leave to Withdraw his plea.

The Motion is supported by an

Affidavit received the 26th day of February 19-93.

The Court

having reviewed the pleadings in this matter, together with the
Affidavit, being cognizant of the circumstance surrounding the
entry of the plea and being aware of the plea negotiation, it
would

appear

that

the

State did

matter, that the Defendant was
authorities

in

a

timely

act expeditiously

turned

fashion,

over

that

to

in .this

the federal

transportation

was

provided by said federal authorities and was out of the hands
and

control

provided

of

the

by granting

State.

No

the Motion.

appropriate relief could be
For the above reason and

those stated in the State's Response the Motion is denied.

q&&
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S t a t e v s . Brocksmith
#921000051
Page 2

Counsel for the State is directed, to prepare a formal Order
in conformance herewith.
Dated this

cPf

d a y of March/

1993

-

BY THE COURT

Gordon J. Low
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I MAILED A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE
ATTACHED NOTICE, BY FIRST CLASS MAIL, POSTAGE PREPAID,
TO THE FOLLOWING:

GARY 0. MCKEAN
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
110 NORTH 100 WEST
LOGAN
UT 84321

DATED T H I S

DAY OF

BARBARA LACHMAR
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
POST OFFICE BOX 4432
LOGAN
UT 84321

19

SI

..MjyQ B. DANKS
Deputy Clerk

ARDEN LAURITZEN
610 NORTH MAIN STREET
P0 BOX 171
LOGAN, UT 84321
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IN THE
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTYSTATE OF UTAH

JACK D. BROCKSMITH,
Defendant ,
District Court No. 921000051
(Circuit Court No* #91001462)
STATE OF UTAHi
Plaintiff•

NOTICE OF APPEAL
NOW COMES Defendant, Jack D. Brocksmith, in pro
se, and appeals to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
and/or the Utah Court of Appeals from the Judgment Order
entered January 14, 1993*
This is not a Notice of Appeal regarding the Defendant's Motion to Withdraw His Plea Bargain.

It is in fact an appeal that addresses itself to
the more fundamental question of jurisdiction*

The Court

will recall that this issue was raised by the Defendant in
his pro se Motion to Dismiss, filed in March, 1990*

It was

raised again by his court-appointed counsel in February,
1992, and denied on October 5, 1992.
Through his court-appointed counsel, Defendant
petitioned the Supreme Court with an interlocutory appeal*
The Supreme Court refused to hear this Motion.

MAR 0 4 1993

GOT)
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(
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2 of 4

pages)

In a narrow set of circumstances, immediate
appeal of a pretrial judgment is available. The Supreme
Court articulated an exception to the final judgment rule
as follows:
11

Finally determining claims of right
separable from, and collateral to*
rights asserted in the action, too
important to be denied review and too
independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be
deferred until the whole case is adjudicated* fl (gotten y Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)
In a criminal case* "The collateral order doctrine"
allows appeal from a judgment that:

(l) Conclusively de-

termines the disputed issue; (2) Is completely separate
from the issue of the defendants guilt; and (3) Is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment•"
(Abney v United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659-63 [1977])
The Supreme Courtfs option not to act on Defendants
interlocutory appeal should not hamper its duty to hear it
now

The right of speedy trial is a constitutional issue

that is fundamental to the ends of justice.
The Defendant was asking with his Motion to dismiss in 1990; the more formal motion filed in February 1992 asked
that the First District Court make legal precedent. This
clearly first impression case has merit for not only this
Defendant, but for Utah case law that is nearly silent on
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.

The First District

Court may have no mandate to create law, but the Appeals
Court of Utah does have not only that commission, but that
responsibility.
~ 2 -

rf± £1 fi
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In November 1991 Defendant did file a 42 U.S.C.
19#3 Action in the United States District Court, Case 91C-1245W, regarding his constitutional rights as to search
and seizure and speedy trial as interpreted by present
Utah law.

This case is still pending.
His guilty plea of January 14, 199J, not with-

standing his waiver of his nonjurisdictional constitutional
rights must be understood in its proper context.

He had

been in the Cache County Jail for nearly a year.

He was

facing a potential five to life sentence for communication fraud - a law that is,to say the least, constitionally
vague.

What he was in reality guilty of was misappropria-

tion, but no such criminal law exists in the state of Utah.
The state was going to recommend consecutive sentencing on
the charges. The Defendant is fifty-four years of age, and
his health is failing.

After conferring with his children,

he did what any reasonable person would do.
This appeal is not to refute the plea agreement,
but whether or not the First District Court as mandated by
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers and the Sixth Amendment was in fact without jurisdiction*

A constitutional

issue of such magnitude deserves the review of a higher
court, and should not be considered a violation of the
plea agreement.
Conclusion
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays this Honorable Court
will grant an appeal of this case, appoint counsel to pre-

~3~
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pare Defendant's appeal, and such other relief as this
Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,

a

T
Dated this

day

of P-C&

D".z Brocksmith
-026-B
Jox 1000
Sandstone MN 55072

1993

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this date, I, the undersigned, do hereby
s'-rear and affirm under penalty of perjury that I did
deposit in the United States mail receptacle at the
Federal Correctional Institution, Sandstone, Minnesota,
with sufficient first class postage, a true and correct
copy of NOTICE OF APPEAL, addressed to:

Gary 0. McKean,

Cache County Attorney, Attorney for the State of Utah,
110 North 100 West, Logan, Utah 84321; and to the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah, State Capitol, Salt
Lake City, UtaJi 84114.

-H
Dated t h i s
of

?£ .

da

y

1993

8773-026-B
'0 Box 1000
andstone MN

55072

